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The Tragedy of Toronto: The Continued Irrelevance of the Toronto Raptors
Forget the Maple Leafs, the Toronto Raptors have exemplified futility in the city of Toronto
By Konstantine Roccas, Staff Writer
Image courtesy of Torontoist.com
Which professional basketball team ranks near the bottom of the NBA in offensive and defensive efficiency, has no salary cap space and no draft picks for the upcoming draft?
If you guessed the Toronto Raptors, then you are correct.
Since its inception into the National Basketball Association (NBA) in 1995, there has rarely been a franchise so mired in mediocrity. Aside from a brief three- year window during the Vince Carter era from 1999-2002, the Raptors have struggled with personnel decisions, questionable decision making, both on and off the court, as well as schizophrenic quick fixes by management. While Canada likes to berate the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey team for their failure these past few years, the Toronto Raptors make the Leafs look like a dynasty by comparison.
The Colangelo Effect:
In recent times, the architect of this mediocrity has been General Manager Bryan Colangelo, the son of Team USA architect and former owner of the Phoenix Suns Jerry Colangelo. Since securing the reigns of leadership in 2006, his stewardship has resulted in a lacklustre period, stunning in its length and reach. While even perennial losers, such as the Golden State Warriors and Los Angeles Clippers, have managed to claw themselves out of the abyss and become viable contenders, the Toronto Raptors have remained frozen in place.
Bryan Colangelo’s (BC) résumé reads like an ancient Greek tragedy. When he gained control of the Raptors, he was also bequeathed with the first overall pick in the 2006 draft, which he parlayed into Andrea Bargnani, who has since become one of the most reviled first overall picks in recent memory. Standing 7 feet tall, the Italian has become known for his lackadaisical play, injury woes and pitiful rebounding rate;he has become the poster child for the continued struggles of the team. In addition, Bargnani also boasts a below league average player efficiency rating (PER), having only broken the average twice in his 7 year career. Respectively, future all-stars Lamarcus Aldridge and Brandon Roy were passed up in the same draft so the Raptors could pick Primo himself.
Draft busts can be forgiven. After all, nobody can fully predict how someone will adapt to the NBA game, which is vastly different from both the European and College levels. Yet, what makes the Bargnani effect so deep and long-lasting in its torture is that BC has continued to commit to his development. He has attempted on many occasions to make Bargnani the team’s star player when most sane General Managers would have cut their losses and traded the man back in 2008. As a reward for his ‘stellar’ contributions, BC rewarded Bargnani with a 5- year, $50 million contract in 2010, which has since been widely denigrated as one of the worst contracts in the league.
Contractual Misery:
The Bargnani experiment is only the tip of the iceberg. While most teams choose to either go through a ‘tanking’ period to acquire draft picks to build a young team, or clear salary cap space to sign superstar free agents, the Raptors have done neither.They frequently trade away the rights to their picks for role-players,or pay obscene amounts of money for players who neither deserve, nor are worth, the contracts to which they are signed.
Since taking the reins in 2006, BC has made a plethora of big deals, the first of which was trading a package of players and the 17th pick in the 2008 draft to the Pacers for an injury depleted Jermaine O’Neal. This 17th pick was Roy Hibbert. He is currently an all-star and defensive anchor for the Indiana Pacers. Jermaine O’Neal was traded before the deadline that year after under-performing as expected by many pundits.
Following that disastrous deal, BC had a team with an all-star on the last year of his contract in Chris Bosh entering the 09/10 season. Instead of trading the disgruntled super-star in order to get something back before his contract expired, BC opted to attempt to woo him to stay with a team that had a maximum ceiling of an 8th seed.
In an attempt to squeeze into the play-offs and keep Bosh, BC did what was quickly becoming his hallmark: he overpaid for a player who was not worth the money. This player was Hedo Turkoglu, who BC decided to bequeath a gargantuan 5-year, $53 million contract. Turkoglu rewarded the investment by showing up to training camp out of shape and showed little effort during the 09/10 campaign, such as when he missed a game due to what he called a ‘stomach virus.’ He was later spotted at a night-club living it up a few hours after the game.
This was the same season that BC signed Bargnani to his 5- year, $50 million dollar contract. The Raptors had gone into the 08/09 off-season flush with cap-space, and instead of waiting out the 09/10 campaign in favour of the 2010 off-season, which eventually saw the most heralded free agent class of all time, BC chose to waste their cap-space on…Andrea Bargnani and Hedo Turkoglu.
The Raptors missed the playoffs yet again. Turkoglu was jettisoned and like a Bosh, Chris Bosh “took his talents to South Beach” the following off-season, prompting the team to go into rebuilding mode, which is odd in retrospect because they seemed to have been rebuilding since 2006.
‘Officially’ Rebuilding:
Having missed the boat on the 2010 free-agent class and having lost their best player in Chris Bosh, the Raptors had little expectations going into the 10/11 season. Instead, they focused on developing their young core, as the season was a bust with the Raptors only winning 22 games.
Because BC had constantly been reaching for the 8th seed in seasons prior, he had placed the Raptors in the unenviable position of being bad enough to miss the playoffs but good enough to not get a high lottery pick in the draft. Due to his refusal to go for an outright tank, the Raptors were left with little regarding prospects and entered the 10/11 season without a true superstar in waiting. Oklahoma City, on the other hand, had quickly turned a few tanked seasons into James Harden, Russell Westbrook, Serge Ibaka, Kevin Durant and a trip to the NBA finals. Following this 22 win season, the Raptors did obtain the number 5 pick in the 2011 draft and parlayed that into Jonas Valanciunas, perhaps the most talented Raptors draft pick in recent memory and admittedly a prudent move on Colangelo’s part.
The lockout shortened season of 11/12 was also considered a rebuilding season by management, however new coach Dwayne Casey was surprisingly able to lead the Raptors to play inspired defensive basketball that year and had them competing every game. Even perennial underachiever Andrea Bargnani managed to play the best stretch of his entire career before going down with injury. This stretch was only 13 games, yet Colangelo assured us that this was a sign of Andrea finally coming into his own.
Apocalypse Now:
Going into the offseason, Raptors fans were optimistic; the team was once again flush with cap space, Bargnani had upped his trade value significantly by actually playing well and Coach Casey appeared to have his team on the right track. Raptors fans were hopeful that with some prudent management, the Raptors could make the playoffs in the 12/13 season. As optimistic as Raptors fans were, the optimism quickly gave way to despair during the offseason.
In classic BC fashion, he attempted to woo a 38 year old Steve Nash to the Toronto Raptors. While a sure-fire hall of fame player and the greatest basketball talent Canada has ever produced, Steve Nash is undoubtedly on the downside of his career as Lakers fans were witness to this season.
In a bid to sign Steve Nash , BC made a $20 million, 3- year offer to Landry Fields in order to prevent the Knicks from working him into a sign-and trade with Phoenix. Landry Fields was a player coming off his 2nd season in which he regressed as a player.
But whatever, the Toronto Raptors were going to sign Steve Nash to a 3-year, $36 million contract! Never mind the fact the Raptors already possessed an efficient pass-first point guard in Jose Calderon, we were going to acquire Captain Canada himself!
Then Nash signed with the Lakers, leaving the Raptors with Landry Fields and his shiny new 20- million- dollar contract.
Regardless , the Raptors still had significant cap space available. Feeling the need to acquire another point guard in lieu of Steve Nash, BC traded the Raptors’ 2013 1st round draft pick, as well as Gary Forbes, to Houston in exchange for Kyle Lowry. While certainly a very able point guard, the Raptors still possessed Jose Calderon, who was entering the last year of his contract and arguably a better pass-first guard than Lowry. Many pundits brought into question the controversy of having two starting calibre point-guards on vying for the top-spot on the team.
Regardless, the Raptors line up for 2012/13 was set. Andrea Bargnani was kept with the belief that he would expand on his mythical 13 game performance and lead the Raptors to a competitive season. Many believed that he should have been traded during the off-season when his trade value was at an all-time high.
With the Raptors about to start the season, BC was optimistic about their chances, proclaiming that, “This year, you come in with different priorities and objectives. . . . If last year was about developing, this year is about winning, more so than ever”.
With these sterling expectations, the Raptors got out of the gate, lost their first game and promptly signed their 4th year player, Demar Derozan, to a 4 year 38 million dollar contract extension set to kick in next season.
If there is any deal that exemplifies the utter futility of upper management since 2006 it is this one. BC signed a player known as a volume shooter with a below average PER on the last year of his contract to a $38 million extension one game into the season. Instead of letting the season play out and evaluating Demar Derozan’s growth in a contract year, BC jumped the gun to sign a player with a sketchy track record to a massive extension. Meanwhile, the Raptors had just drafted a similar player with arguably a higher ceiling than Demar in Terrence Ross. Needless to say, contracts like Derozan’s are why lockouts happen; executives betting against no one in particular to sign a player to a contract they aren’t worth.
From this point on, it was all downhill for the Raptors 2012-2013 season.
Following this deal, the Raptors bucked all optimism by going 4-20 to start the season. Bargnani proved ineffective once again and went down with injury. Kyle Lowry showed up out of shape and was beset by injury woes and both were replaced in the starting line-up by Jose Calderon and a young Ed Davis. Davis made the most of the opportunity and led the Raptors to a bit of a recovery in the months of December and January behind some efficient play.
While the fan base was at least excited that young players like Ed Davis and Jonas Valanciunas were developing and that Calderon was having one of the most efficient seasons of his career while leading the team to a respectable showing in December and January, it posed a problem for BC.
Here was a team that was utilizing none of the signings that he had made during the offseason. Kyle Lowry was being utilized as a backup point-guard behind Calderon. Meanwhile, 2nd year player Ed Davis, on a rookie’s minimum contract, had taken over Bargnani’s position and produced much better numbers while showing some grit and hustle, as evidenced by his rebounding efforts. In addition, Landry Fields had played sparingly and had been inefficient when he did play. So what does BC do? Trade away his two most efficient players in Calderon and Davis on an expiring and a rookie contract respectively for quite possibly the most over-paid player in the league: Rudy Gay.
The Rudy Gay Trade and Beyond:
To understand this trade, the course of the Raptors under the captaincy of Bryan Colangelo needs to first be understood.
Here was a team that in 2011/2012 and the early part of 2012/2013, had shown some growth amongst its young players when they were given an opportunity to play. Instead of letting them develop and giving them playing time, while accumulating 1st round draft picks for the 2014 draft (a process known as ‘tanking’), Colangelo went into ‘win now’ mode and sought to just eke out a playoff berth as evidenced by the signings during the 2012 offseason. The Rudy Gay trade this past January is merely an extension on Colangelo’s flawed philosophy.
Here was a player who had been signed to a maximum contract worth roughly $17 million a year by the Memphis Grizzlies a few seasons prior. While a solid scorer, Rudy Gay has the dubious distinction of never making an all-star team while having never led the Grizzlies beyond the first round of the play-offs. In addition, he is known as a volume shooter who tends to take inadvisable 3- point shots at a low percentage. Yes, he will give you 20 points a game, but it will come at the expense of efficiency and a low field goal percentage.
In offloading Gay to the Raptors, the Grizzlies received massive salary relief, a very promising young player in Ed Davis and the benefit of much more efficient play as evidenced by their current run to the Western Conference Finals. Ball Don’t Lie Yahoo analyst Kelly Dwyer points out that, “The Grizzlies were awful with Gay dominating late-game possessions in the postseason last year, and statistically the worst fourth-quarter team in the NBA prior to the trade [to Toronto] mostly because Gay wasn’t “afraid to take the big one“. Inside-out play still dominates all even in the NBA’s modern, perimeter-dominated era. And efficiency matters in the playoffs, when the rotations tighten and every possession counts.”
This is what the Raptors acquired and aside from an early honeymoon period in February, Rudy Gay has produced at a rate in line with his career statistics. So enamoured was BC with Rudy Gay that he claimed they were looking to extend his max contract over the summer.
This is the reality of the Toronto Raptors going into next season. A team over the salary cap playing inefficient basketball with a maximum ceiling of an 8th seed. The Raptors now have one of the most bloated payrolls in the NBA with little room for growth. Furthermore, the 2014 draft is slotted to be the best draft class since 2003 with franchise altering talents such as Canadian Andrew Wiggins, Jabari Parker, Marcus Smart and more. Wiggins in particular is being compared to Lebron James and Kobe Bryant and is the consensus #1 pick before playing a single game at the college level. Imagine what that would do for basketball in Canada if the Raptors acquired a Canadian talent on the level of Wiggins.
With the current roster, the Raptors are just good enough to fight for a low playoff seed, excluding them from the NBA lottery yet again. This is what the future looks like for the Raptors if changes aren’t made.
Opportunity Lost: MLSE and the continued Irrelevance of the Toronto Raptors
The sad part about this situation is that it didn’t have to be like this. Toronto is the 3rd largest city in the NBA, behind New York and Los Angeles and boasts an incredibly supportive and enthusiastic crowd. As the only NBA franchise in Canada, it has a prospective fan-base of over 35 million, well beyond that of any NBA team. The marketing potential for young athletes to be a Canadian icon is huge.
Regardless, BC has insisted that we have to overpay for talent and there is a perception around the league that Toronto is a mid-market city. Instead of promoting all that Toronto has to offer to players and the league alike, the Raptors have continued to do nothing of note since 2006. While some of the blame in this poor promotion falls strictly on BC, some of it also falls on Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment (MLSE), the much-maligned ownership group of both the Raptors and the Toronto Maple Leafs.
Most NBA owners run a tight ship and keep an eye on the quality of their teams. A good owner evaluates talent and management while understanding the minutia of the game. If a General Manager falls outside of expectations, he is released by the owner.
MLSE follows none of these rules. As hockey is #1 in Canada, MLSE has seen fit to give BC free run over the asylum with little concern over quality. After all, the Raptors are profitable, have good attendance and do just enough to compete every night. Sound familiar Leafs fans?
The problem really begins and ends with MLSE. As they are an ownership group and not an individual, BC has often sought to do just enough to keep his job, hence the perpetual hunt for the 8th playoff seed and the ensuing mediocrity season after season. By selling MLSE the Kool-Aid, which they have gladly drank, the Raptors have been doomed to years of mediocrity. Remember, MLSE is a group of businessmen who are in the business of making sports profitable first and foremost: They care more about the money than they do winning. When coupled with the fact that basketball ranks behind hockey in Toronto you have a recipe for disaster.
A Wild Saviour Appears…Maybe:
Recent developments at MLSE though, have given the starved fan base some cause to hope. Tim Leiweke, former CEO of the AEG group in LA that owns the LA Kings and 30% of the Los Angeles Lakers, has been named President and CEO of MLSE. Having played a central role in the construction of Staples Center in LA, as well as being closely associated with championship winning organizations, he has led some fans to believe change is coming.
Leiweke has certainly said all the right things to get the fans excited. In a recent interview, Leiweke says that, “the Raptors are the team that needs the most help: they haven’t been in the playoffs in six years and I think that’s a trend that we have to change. So I’ll probably spend more time on the Raptors to begin with.” Furthermore, he realizes the untapped potential of the Canadian basketball market.
While Leiweke has led us to believe otherwise, there is still some apprehension over how MLSE will deal with the BC situation. Since Leiweke does not assume full operations of MLSE until June, there is currently some confusion over the whole Raptors situation with various news outlets reporting differing rumours.
Most expected a decision on Colangelo to be made almost immediately once Leiweke was hired, yet MLSE has dithered and the deadline to pick up the last year option on Colangelo’s contract is May 17. Instead of dealing with the situation in a professional manner, MLSE has dropped the ball once again, reportedly hiring a head-hunting firm to aid in the search for a potential replacement General Manager for the club. This firm then came to the brilliant conclusion that the best option for the Raptors is Denver Nuggets GM Masai Ujiri, reigning executive of the year. If anything exemplifies the current incompetence of MLSE, this does.
By prolonging this decision until the final hour, MLSE is more than likely aiming for a replacement GM, but is waiting to see if their potential targets accept before they make a decision on BC. What is likely going to happen is MLSE picking up the option for the final year of BC’s contract, with Tim Leiweke having careful oversight over any personnel decisions. It is unlikely that Masai Ujiri or any other executive, will be eager to leave contenders for a team with little room to manoeuvre due to the plethora of bad contracts and dismal draft options.
Ladies and gentlemen, your Toronto Raptors!
Afterword: Following the submission date of this feature, MLSE took what should have been a simple matter and made it a lot murkier than it should have been. While declining to pick up the option on Colangelo as GM of the Toronto Raptors, they rolled his contract over into the position of President of Basketball Operations for MLSE. His job will be to report basketball business decisions to Tim Leiweke while new GM Masai Ujiri will have the final say on personnel decisions and will be free to request advice from Colangelo as he sees fit. His first order of business reportedly is to seek a taker for Andrea Bargnani’s contract.
Konstantine Roccas is an observer of local and international affairs and governance, but also writes about anything else that piques his ire. A lifelong basketball fan, he also eats a half kilo of Greek Yogurt daily. He writes for the Arbitrage Magazine. More of his work can be found at myriadtruths.blogspot.ca and he can be followed on Twitter @KosteeRoccas
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